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OVERCHARGING 
Kyle Graham

 
The prosecutors in several recent high-profile criminal cases have been 
accused of “overcharging” their quarry.1 These complaints have implied—and 
sometimes expressly asserted—that by “overcharging,” the prosecutors engaged 
in socially undesirable, illegitimate, and even corrupt behavior.
2
 United States 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia also weighed in on the “overcharging” 
phenomenon not long ago, describing this practice as a predictable though 
regrettable aspect of modern plea bargaining.
3
 
Unfortunately, many of these commentators either have failed to explain 
precisely what they meant by “overcharging,” or have used the same word to 
                                                          

  Assistant Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law.  
1
  E.g., John Dean, Dealing With Aaron Swartz in the Nixonian Tradition: Overzealous 
Overcharging Leads to a Tragic Result, JUSTIA (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/01/25/dealing-with-aaron-swartz-in-the-nixonian-tradition (stating, 
as to the recent prosecution of Aaron Swartz, the “case was seriously, unnecessarily, and brutally 
overcharged,” with the prosecutors “using a sledgehammer for something that was merely worthy 
of a slap on the wrist”); David Friedman, Overcharging: The Aaron Swartz Case, IDEAS (Jan. 24, 
2013, 7:51 AM), http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.com/2013/01/overcharging-aaron-swartz-
case.html; Emily Bazelon, When the Law Is Worse Than the Crime, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2013, 3:59 
PM),  
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/01/aaron_swartz_suicide_prosecutors_
have_too_much_power_to_charge_and_intimidate.html (describing the Swartz prosecution as an 
instance of “egregious overcharging of crimes by the U.S. attorney’s office in the name of setting 
an example.”); John R. Lott Jr., Where’s the ‘Probable Cause’?, THE NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE 
(April 13, 2012, 2:45 PM), www.nationalreview.com/articles/295984/where-s-probable-cause-
john-r-lott-jr (observing that the prosecutor of George Zimmerman, charged with the murder of 
Trayvon Martin, “has most likely deliberately overcharged, hoping to intimidate Zimmerman into 
agreeing to a plea bargain.”); John Schwartz, Severe Charge, With a Minimum Term of 25 Years, 
N.Y. TIMES (April 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/us/zimmerman-faces-second-
degree-murder-charge-in-florida.html (quoting a defense attorney’s suggestion that Zimmerman 
may have been “overcharged”); Scott Bonn, Casey Anthony trial was a case of overzealous 
prosecution: Death penalty was a bar too high, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 7, 2011, 4:00 a.m.) 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/casey-anthony-trial-case-overzealous-prosecution-death-
penalty-bar-high-article-1.160804#ixzz2Lmmfm9QN (“Arguably, the prosecution ‘overcharged’ 
the case against [Casey] Anthony [by charging her with first-degree murder] and would have been 
better off going with a charge of nonnegligent manslaughter or even second-degree murder.”);  Is 
O.J. Being Overcharged?, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (Sept. 18, 2007, 7:56 PM), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2007/09/is-oj-being-ove.html. 
2
  E.g., Dean, supra note 1; Bazelon, supra note 1. See also United States v. Robertson, 15 
F.3d 862, 876 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“The practice of overcharging a defendant involves an 
abuse of the prosecutor’s generally unreviewable discretion.”) (footnote omitted). 
3
  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1372, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (surmising that plea 
bargaining “presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an 
innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense.”). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2227193
2 
 
describe different types of charging practices.
4
 The various meanings given to 
“overcharging,” when the term is defined at all, have made it difficult to ascertain 
what this practice entails, why it is improper, and who the worst offenders are.
5
  
This essay aims to improve the ongoing conversation about overcharging 
in two ways: first, by disentangling and fleshing out the core meanings of this 
term; and second, by proposing some metrics to identify prosecutors who 
chronically overcharge. As to the first of these matters, this essay explains how 
the term “overcharging” can communicate three different criticisms of 
prosecutorial practices. The first approach toward overcharging objects to the 
allegation of crimes without adequate proof. A second criticism resembles the 
first in that it holds criminal charges to some objective or other extrinsic standard 
of propriety, but differs in that it is concerned with a lack of proportionality 
between the nature or consequences of the charges in a case on the one hand, and 
the gravamen of the defendant’s alleged misconduct on the other. A third 
conception of overcharging combines objective and subjective elements. This 
perspective also perceives inadequate proof or a lack of proportionality, but 
particularly condemns a prosecutor’s conscious decision to allege overstated 
charges in order to maneuver the defendant into a plea bargain in which some or 
all of the charges will be dismissed or reduced. As detailed below, each of these 
basic criticisms has its strengths and shortcomings, which may explain why they 
are commonly merged or strung together. Yet the differences matter, especially 
because some perceived solutions to overcharging address only one or two of 
these critiques.  
Next, this essay proposes and then applies a rudimentary methodology for 
tracking how often particular prosecuting authorities overcharge. Some 
commentators have said that it is impossible to spot overcharging in a given case, 
at least without an admission by the prosecutor involved.
6
 Perhaps this is true. But 
                                                          
4
  WILLIAM F. MCDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON PRACTICES 
19 (1985) (“even when the same term [overcharging] is used it often has different meanings.”); 
Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging Function, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 1259, 1279 (2011) (“it is not completely clear what ‘overcharging’ means, or why 
the practice is illegitimate.”). See also SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF 
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950–1990 91 (1993) (“The issue of overcharging is very 
complicated. The term has several meanings.”); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea 
Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 41 (1983) 
(“ ‘Overcharging’ is an ambiguous term.”) 
5
  See Is O.J. Being Overcharged, supra note 1 (“As many know (through few will admit), 
some — only a few?  many?  most? — prosecutors are willing and perhaps eager to file as many 
charges as they plausibly can in order to create bargaining leverage and bargaining room for 
inevitable plea discussions.”) 
6
  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 454 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (opining that 
“[n]ormally . . . it is impossible to show that” a prosecutor is engaging in overcharging); Bennett 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2227193
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perhaps patterns of overcharging can be gleaned from larger collections of cases. 
Toward this purpose, this essay presents an original review of several years’ 
worth of federal charging and conviction data. This study reveals the United 
States Attorney’s offices that have produced patterns of charging and conviction 
over this span that raise yellow, if not red flags regarding systemic overcharging. 
Although these results admittedly do not establish frequent overcharging on their 
own, they do point toward those offices that have built charging and conviction 
records that may warrant further scrutiny. 
This essay does not offer a prescription for ending or abating 
overcharging, however that term is defined.
7
 Hopefully, though, the brief 
discussion below will lay a foundation for increasingly cogent consideration of 
overcharging, identification of prosecuting authorities who consistently 
overcharge, and potential responses to the practice. 
I. WHAT IS “OVERCHARGING”? 
 
The word “overcharging,” as directed at prosecutorial charging practices, 
first appeared in the academic literature in the mid-1960s.
8
 Shortly thereafter, in 
1968, Professor Albert Alschuler devised a basic vocabulary for overcharging that 
remains influential today.   
 
A. “Horizontal” and “Vertical” Overcharging 
 
In his article The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining,9 Professor 
Alschuler described two different types of overcharging: “horizontal” 
overcharging and “vertical” overcharging.10  As Alschuler described them, both 
“horizontal” and “vertical” overcharging represent tactics that prosecutors employ 
to catalyze plea bargains. Both practices set the stage for possible “charge 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20 
FORD. URB. L.J. 513, 521 (1993) (“It is improper for prosecutors to use overcharging as a leverage 
device to more readily obtain guilty pleas or to provide a trial jury a broader range of charges that 
might more readily produce a compromise verdict. However, proving such improper prosecutorial 
motivation is virtually impossible.”)  
7
   This article does not draw normative conclusions regarding overcharging, however 
defined, although it does attempt to pinpoint the concerns that animate particular perceptions of 
the practice. For a catalogue and critique of prescriptions for addressing overcharging, see DANIEL 
S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
INNOCENT 19–33 (2012). 
8
  E.g., Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 
55 GEO. L.J. 1030, 1035 (1967).  
9
  36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968). 
10
  Id. at 85–87. 
4 
 
bargaining,” a type of plea bargaining in which the prosecutor agrees to dismiss or 
reduce a charge or charges in exchange for the defendant’s guilty or no-contest 
plea to another offense or offenses.
11
  
 
The principal difference between “horizontal” and “vertical” overcharging 
concerns their form. According to Alschuler, “horizontal” overcharging consists 
of “multiplying ‘unreasonably’ the number of accusations against a single 
defendant.”12 The practitioners with whom Alschuler spoke when preparing his 
article described two subspecies of this practice: charging a defendant “with a 
separate offense for every criminal transaction in which he has allegedly 
participated”13 and “fragment[ing] a single criminal transaction into numerous 
component offenses.”14  
 
Regardless of the form that “horizontal” overcharging took, the main 
criticism of the practice that Alschuler recorded lay in the prosecutor’s tactical use 
of seemingly extraneous charges to triangulate toward a plea bargain. On this 
point, Alschuler wrote that “[w]hen defense attorneys condemn this practice, they 
usually do not disagree with the prosecutor’s evaluation of the quantum of proof 
necessary to justify an accusation. Usually, they concede, there is ample evidence 
to support all of the prosecutor’s charges.”15 To these attorneys, the perceived 
unreasonableness of the charges owed instead to the fact that the “excess” counts 
“are not usually filed against a single defendant because the prosecutor is 
interested in securing . . . convictions [for these charges]. The charges may be 
filed instead in an effort to induce the defendant to plead guilty to a few of the 
charges, in exchange for dismissal of the rest.”16 
 
Alschuler’s sources also related an alternative form of overcharging, 
which he referred to as “vertical” overcharging. “Vertical” overcharging consists 
of: 
 
                                                          
11
  Kyle Graham, Facilitating Crimes: An Inquiry into the Selective Invocation of Offenses 
with the Continuum of Criminal Procedures, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L.REV. 665, 686–87 (2011); 
Stephen S. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 278–82 (1989) (discussing 
“charge bargaining” by federal prosecutors).  
12
  Alschuler, supra note 9, at 85. 
13
  Id. at 87. 
14
  Id.  
15
  Id. 
16
  Id.  
5 
 
Charging a single offense at a higher level than the circumstances 
of the case seem to warrant. The allegedly extravagant charge 
usually encompasses, as a “lesser included offense,” the crime for 
which the prosecutor actually seeks conviction. In this situation, as 
in cases of horizontal overcharging, the claim is not that 
prosecutors charge crimes of which the defendant is clearly 
innocent; it is instead that they set the evidentiary threshold at far 
too low a level in drafting their initial allegations. Usually, defense 
attorneys claim, prosecutors file their accusations at the highest 
level for which there is even the slightest possibility of 
conviction.
17
 
 
Thus, in both vertical and horizontal overcharging, the prosecutor 
originally alleges a charge or charges that she subjectively does not want to 
pursue to conviction, or is indifferent about prosecuting. Instead, the extraneous 
or unduly severe allegations are put forward to incentivize the defendant to plead 
guilty to another charge or charges. The two practices differ in that horizontal 
overcharging anticipates charge dismissals as part of a desired plea bargain, while 
vertical overcharging envisages charge substitution in a plea deal. Furthermore, at 
least as Alschuler characterized the practices, only vertical overcharging entails 
charges premised “insufficient” proof, however sufficiency is to be measured. 
 
Some modern commentators continue to recognize a basic distinction 
between horizontal and vertical overcharging.
18
 This bifurcation is useful, but 
lacks comprehensiveness and rigor. Alschuler’s description of “vertical” 
overcharging, for example, does not account for the scenario in which the 
prosecutor files a charge on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but with the intent 
to substitute a lesser charge as part of a plea deal. If strategic “horizontal” 
overcharging warrants condemnation even when premised on plentiful proof, why 
doesn’t this example involve comparable “vertical” overcharging? Likewise, why 
doesn’t the allegation of ancillary, extraneous charges on insufficient proof 
represent a subspecies of “horizontal” overcharging?  
 
                                                          
17
  Id. at 86. 
18
  E.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the 
Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 85 (2011) (“Scholars suggest that there are two basic 
types of overcharging. Prosecutors can engage in either horizontal overcharging by filing charges 
for distinct crimes resulting from similar offensive conduct, or vertical overcharging by charging 
harsh variations of the same crime when the evidence only supports lesser variations.”); Ana 
Maria Gutierrez, The Sixth Amendment: The Operation of Plea Bargaining in Contemporary 
Criminal Procedure, 87 DEN. U. L. REV. 695, 697 n. 16 (2010) (“There are two types of 
overcharging: horizontal and vertical.”). 
6 
 
The simple horizontal-vertical framework also fails to consider whether 
overcharging may occur even when the prosecutor does not subjectively intend to 
bargain a charge down, or away. As it stands, this taxonomy of “overcharging” 
begs the question of whether, on its own, a departure from customary charging 
practices,
19
 perceived disproportionality between the punishment attached to 
charges and the moral blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct, or other 
disconnects can support a claim of “overcharging.” If not, why not—particularly 
when observers have been using the word “overcharging” to convey precisely 
these criticisms?
20
 
 
One cannot blame Professor Alschuler for these gaps. He sought to make 
sense of what practitioners were telling him, not to define “overcharging” for all 
purposes going forward. But it has become evident that modern commentators, 
even as they sometimes use the horizontal-vertical terminology to describe the 
specific forms that overcharging can take, also apply the “overcharging” label to 
more fundamental criticisms of prosecutorial practices.  
 
B. Three Meanings of “Overcharging” 
 
Alschuler’s terminology provides a practical overlay to three more basic 
understandings of overcharging.
21
 These descriptions often get merged or 
concatenated in criticisms of perceived overcharging,
22
 but they merit parsing 
insofar as they relate distinct though overlapping criticisms.  
 
At a foundational level, claims of “overcharging” communicate one or 
more concerns about charging decisions. One perception of overcharging 
concentrates on the filing of criminal counts that lack adequate proof. Another 
conception of overcharging dwells on the lack of proportionality between the 
numerosity, gravamen, or sentencing consequences of a criminal charge or 
                                                          
19
  See MCDONALD, supra note 4, at 19–20 (describing this as a type of “vertical” 
overcharging). 
20
  E.g., Dean, supra note 1. 
21
  There may exist other, less commonly invoked definitions of “overcharging.” See, e.g., 
People v. O’Bryan, No. 292570, 2011 WL 165410 at *7 (Mich. App. Jan. 18, 2011) (“The test for 
prosecutorial overcharging is not whether the prosecution’s choice of charges was unreasonable or 
unfair, but whether the charging decision was made for reasons that were unconstitutional, illegal, 
or ultra vires.”)  
22
  E.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 31 (2007) (“Prosecutors routinely engage in overcharging, a practice that involves 
‘tacking on’ additional charges that they know they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt or 
that they can technically prove but are inconsistent with the legislative intent or otherwise 
inappropriate.”). 
7 
 
charges on the one hand, and the character of the defendant’s conduct on the 
other. While these first two approaches toward overcharging contrast charging 
decisions against objective (though sometimes difficult to pin down) or other 
extrinsic standards, a third critique is more concerned with the subjective 
intentions of prosecutors. This view perceives overcharging when a prosecutor 
deliberately uses excessive allegations to induce a plea bargain to lesser or 
otherwise different charges.  
 
These differences are important for practical as well as theoretical reasons. 
Many of the solutions that have been proposed to end or abate overcharging do 
not respond to all three concerns. Even if these suggestions perform as advertised, 
therefore, they will not end the overcharging debate. For example, proposals to 
reduce the “discount” that prosecutors can offer in connection with plea 
bargains
23
 may not address “disproportionate” overcharging that is not intended to 
coerce a plea. Meanwhile, the adoption of recommendations to raise the 
evidentiary “floor” for criminal charges24 will not necessarily deter prosecutors 
from engaging in overcharging in which charges are filed on ample proof, but 
with the subjective intent that they be bargained away in exchange for guilty pleas 
to other crimes. To provide a better sense of these possible disconnects, the 
discussion below relates each conception of overcharging, and the concerns 
behind it, in some detail. 
 
1. Overcharging as Charging Without Adequate Proof  
First, some descriptions of overcharging connect this term to the filing of 
charges without sufficient proof.
25
 At its core, this critique attacks these charges 
as falling short of an objective threshold for criminal allegations. 
                                                          
23
  See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based 
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1254–56 (2008) (discussing how “fixed discounts” on pleas 
would constrain overcharging). 
24
  See MEDWED, supra note 8, at 20–21 (discussing possible reforms to the probable-cause 
standard for charging). 
25
  E.g.., Gifford, supra note 4, at 41 (observing that in its “strongest sense,” “overcharging” 
“means filing charges for which the prosecutor does not even have sufficient evidence to support a 
finding of ‘probable cause.’”); Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 
2012, at A24 (“Prosecutors regularly ‘overcharge’ defendants with a more serious crime than what 
actually occurred”); Ed Brayton, How to Deal with Prosecutors Overcharging, FREETHOUGHT 
BLOGS (Apr. 20, 2012), http://freethoughtblogs.com/dispatches/2012/04/20/how-to-deal-with-
prosecutors-overcharging/ (“One of the hallmarks of our criminal injustice system is overcharging 
by prosecutors. They routinely charge defendants with far more than they can prove because that 
puts maximum pressure on the person to cop a plea.”); Ted Rohrlich, High-Profile Losses Tarnish 
Reputation of D.A.’s Office, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, at 1 (stating that in Los Angeles, “Elected 
district attorneys may have gotten carried away by emotions or politics and charged defendants 
with more crimes than they could prove,” a practice the article describes as “overcharging”). 
8 
 
This approach addresses a coherent concern, at least in theory. Positive 
ethical proscriptions, such as the American Bar Association Standards for the 
Prosecution Function,
26
 prohibit the filing of charges on inadequate proof.
27
 With 
good reasons; among them, the frequent filing of charges on bare minima of 
evidence would lead to a greater number of erroneous convictions. Though juries 
and judges play important roles in weeding out weak cases, prosecutors play a 
necessary part in this process, too. If prosecutors entirely forfeited this 
responsibility, it would remove an important screening phrase from criminal 
proceedings. Furthermore, such an abdication would reduce the time and effort 
that prosecutors (and defense attorneys, and judges, and juries) would spend on 
their more meritorious cases, meaning that those cases, as well, might yield 
“incorrect” outcomes more often.  
That said, concerns about charging on inadequate proof may be 
overstated.
28
 First, most prosecutors understand that it is unethical to bring 
charges on patently inadequate grounds.
29
 Second, for good or for ill, modern 
criminal codes are so robust that a prosecutor who cannot find probable cause for 
some crime may need to have both her priorities and her bar license questioned.
30
 
Third, from the prosecutor’s selfish perspective, filing paper-thin charges may 
prove counterproductive. Assuming a relatively full docket, the prosecution of a 
marginal case will draw the prosecutor’s attention, time, and other resources away 
from the rest of her caseload. For little purpose; this form of overcharging will 
often fail to induce convictions by way of a plea bargain or trial. The prevailing 
ethical “floor” for a criminal charge is probable cause.31 Probable cause is not a 
                                                          
26
  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 
1993) (“A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued 
pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by 
probable cause.”). 
27
  Gershman, supra note 4, at 1263; Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The 
Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2197 
(2010) (“prosecutors in the vast majority of jurisdictions may file criminal charges so long as they 
believe they are supported by probable cause, a standard that many scholars have derided as 
woefully inadequate in filtering out the innocent.”). 
28
  See Lawrence S. Goldman, Prosecutorial Overcharging is Not “Regular,” WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG (Aug. 28 2012), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2012/08/see-here-see-here-see-here.html, 
(“Federal prosecutors do not, in my view, ‘regularly’ overcharge defendants ‘with a more serious 
crime than what actually occurred,’ at least in white-collar cases (although they often pile on 
unnecessary if legally unjustifiable multiple charges).”). 
29
  See MCDONALD, supra note 4, at 22 (“charging a defendant without probable cause for 
any of the charges filed would be unanimously condemned.”). 
30
  See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW (2008) (discussing a perceived surfeit of criminal offenses in contemporary criminal codes). 
31
  Medwed, supra note 27, at 2197. 
9 
 
high standard of proof, and in a given case evidence that just satisfies probable 
cause is usually detectably different from proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
32
 
Charges that lack probable cause therefore may not convince a defendant to enter 
a guilty plea, even to lesser charges. Instead, a significant percentage of 
defendants will press for trials.
33
 And at these trials, the prosecutor cannot 
reasonably expect the juries or judges to reliably return guilty verdicts to 
overblown charges. Ultimately, then, a practice of routine overcharging promises 
more work and more acquittals for the prosecutor.  
Of course, one might reject the probable-cause standard for charges as too 
low, and spot overcharging whenever a criminal count is supported by something 
less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
34
 Prosecutors sometimes misgauge a 
case’s strength, meaning that this sort of overcharging probably happens more 
often than would be ideal. Yet it may overstate the capabilities of prosecutors to 
assume that they routinely file charges that they know just barely lack proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. As just stated, there usually exists a palpable 
difference between evidence that barely meets the probable cause threshold and 
evidence that amounts to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, it can be 
difficult—sometimes impossible—to ascertain whether the evidence in a case 
falls just north or south of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.  
The simple truth, then, is that in most cases, when prosecutors could 
knowingly overcharge within the “inadequate proof” meaning of the term, this 
tactic won’t induce a conviction; and when the tactic might work, a prosecutor 
who presses charges typically won’t be aware that she is overcharging at all. Thus 
most “true” overcharges, in the sense that a charge patently lacks proof sufficient 
for a conviction, likely involve a prosecutor’s misunderstanding of the pertinent 
law, or the facts of a case.
35
 These mistakes may involve professional negligence. 
But they rarely entail a more sinister scienter.  
                                                          
32
  Gershman, supra note 4, at 1266–70 (“the subjective probable cause standard is so 
minimal that it offers very little protection from careless and reckless charging, to say nothing of a 
prosecutor’s deliberate and bad faith charging”).  
33
  See Brooke A. Masters and Carrie Johnson, Corporate Scandals Yield Few Plea Deals; 
Top Executives Take Best Shot in Court, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2004, at A1 (quoting a defense 
attorney as saying, “If people believe they have been improperly charged or overcharged . . . they 
want their day in court.”). 
34
  E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 87 (rev. ed. 2012) (“The prosecutor is 
also free to file more charges against a defendant than realistically can be proven in court, so long 
as probable cause arguably exists—a practice known as overcharging.”) 
35
  See PAUL BENNETT, PROSECUTORIAL OVERCHARGING 1 (1979) (“Not all overcharges are 
the result of the prosecutor’s deliberate abuse of charging discretion. The prosecutor may simply 
be mistaken on the law or the facts in bringing more or higher charges than are justified. Another 
possibility is that the law concerning a particular fact situation may be unclear. The prosecutor 
10 
 
All this said, certain circumstances may increase the likelihood of 
conscious charging on inadequate proof. Most notably, as Alschuler’s description 
of “vertical” overcharging implies,36 to the extent that an excessive charge 
encompasses lesser-included offenses or possesses other attractive “landing spots” 
for a plea bargain, these options reduce the risk of an all-or-nothing prosecution, 
and encourage strategic overcharging.
37
 Meanwhile, high-profile cases invite 
overreaching by prosecutors.
38
 In these matters, a prosecutor may succumb to 
public clamor and charge a relatively serious offense, even upon only marginal 
proof. A prosecutor who takes this route can blame any resulting acquittal or 
reduction of charges at trial on the judge or jury, while still leaving open the 
possibility of a subsequent plea bargain to lesser charges should the furor abate. 
Furthermore, where there exists at least one “strong” charge in a case, a 
prosecutor sometimes may not vet other, accompanying charges as carefully as 
she should, or be tempted to file additional charges as plea-bargaining fodder. 
Since there exists a high likelihood of a conviction on at least one count, the 
prosecutor may regard the modest marginal effort associated with charging and 
trying the other, weaker counts as more than offset by the possibility that these 
additional charges will help convince a defendant to enter a guilty plea.
39
  
In any event, it is difficult to pin down the pervasiveness of overcharging, 
if defined as charges premised on insufficient proof.  The rate of trial acquittals in 
a jurisdiction might provide some indication, but there exist some obvious reasons 
why this metric would fail to provide much insight into whether or not a 
prosecuting authority chronically files factually thin allegations. Among them, 
some crimes are simply harder to prove than others are; juries sometimes vote to 
nullify, even in cases supported by adequate proof; and the quality of defense 
representation varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. These and other extrinsic 
complications present significant obstacles to gaining an accurate grasp of the 
prevalence of this form of overcharging.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
then resolves the ambiguity in his own favor and leaves it to the courts to say whether he was 
wrong.”). 
36
  Alschuler, supra note 9, at 86–87. 
37
  See Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a 
Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1953–54 
(2006) (discussing the role that “landing points” play in plea bargaining). 
38
  See Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, BART shooting a trial by fire for new D.A., S.F. 
CHRON., May 19, 2010, at C1 (stating, of a high-profile murder case against a former BART 
police officer, “many police officers . . . think the case was overcharged”); Rohrlich, supra note 
25. 
39
  Of course, a prosecutor may not want to “dilute” what the judge and jury might otherwise 
perceive as a strong case by filing palpably weak additional charges.   
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2. Overcharging as Filing Charges Disproportionate to the Crime 
 
A second basic impression of overcharging uses the term to describe 
charging decisions that either allege “too many” crimes, place too harsh a label on 
the defendant’s conduct, or threaten punishment that seems too severe in light of 
the factual allegations directed against the defendant.
40
 This take on overcharging 
typically admits the legal sufficiency of a charge or charges, but attacks the 
accusations directed against the defendant as being disproportionate to his or her 
misconduct, in the sense that the charges are out of step with custom, moral 
norms, or common sense.
41
  
 
This perception of overcharging resembles the first in that both contrast 
the prosecutor’s decision with an objective or extrinsic view of “proper” 
charges.
42
 Furthermore, as with the first definition, this approach does not 
necessarily implicate the practice of plea bargaining. A prosecutor can 
overcharge, under this meaning of the term, regardless of whether she 
subjectively intends to plea bargain some or all of the charges away, or pursue 
them to conviction through trial practice. This view instead attacks the 
prosecutor’s failure to properly exercise her discretion and make a reasonably 
proportionate charging decision.  
 
Like the first critique of overcharging, the second assessment applies a 
plausible gloss to the term. But a conception of overcharging premised on a 
perceived lack of proportionality suffers from the lack of a coherent, widely 
                                                          
40
  This approach to overcharging permeated much of the criticism of the prosecution of 
Aaron Swartz. E.g., Friedman, supra note 1 (commenting, on the recent criminal case against 
hacker Aaron Swartz, “I do not know whether what Aaron Swartz did ought to have been 
punished at all, but I think it would be hard to find anyone, including the prosecutor, willing to 
argue that it ought to have received the punishment that the prosecutor threatened to impose.”). 
41
  These sentiments undergird a petition to remove the federal prosecutor who brought the 
Aaron Swartz case, as well as the U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts who oversaw the 
prosecution. The petition provides, in pertinent part, “A prosecutor who does not understand 
proportionality and who regularly uses the threat of unjust and overreaching charges to extort plea 
bargains from defendants regardless of their guilt is a danger to the life and liberty of anyone who 
might cross her path.” We Petition the Obama Administration to: Remove United States District 
Attorney Carmen Ortiz from office for overreach in the case of Aaron Swartz, WE THE PEOPLE 
(Jan. 12, 2013), https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/remove-united-states-district-attorney-
carmen-ortiz-office-overreach-case-aaron-swartz/RQNrG1Ck. 
42
  Here, this essay uses “extrinsic” to describe proportionality critiques that condemn a 
charging decision as inconsistent with the observer’s personal views or values. These beliefs may 
not admit to distillation into a single objective standard, but remain extrinsic to the prosecutor’s 
subjective mindset at charging.  
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accepted baseline for determining what amounts to “proper” charges.43 Without 
an agreed-upon touchstone for “reasonable” charging decisions, this attack begs 
infinitely debatable questions regarding what theories of criminalization and 
punishment should apply generally, and in a given case. Moreover, even a 
consensus as to basic principles does not necessarily yield agreement on the 
specific charges and punishment terms that should adhere in particular cases.  
 
This understanding of overcharging also leaves open whether the 
“proportionality” inquiry should focus upon the number and nature of the charges 
themselves, or on the specific penalties that attach to them; and if the latter, 
whether the maximum or the “likely” penalties upon conviction merit more 
attention. Put another way, critics of “disproportionate” prosecutions might spot 
overcharging when prosecutors allege crimes that (1) somehow, on their face, 
seem more numerous or serious than the defendant’s conduct warrants, even if the 
defendant’s behavior technically satisfies the elements of the offense or offenses; 
(2) carry maximum penalties that appear disproportionate—even if these 
maximum penalties almost certainly would not apply to the defendant;
44
 or (3) 
plausibly might lead to excessive punishment in the defendant’s specific case.  
 
These matters often coincide; “excessive” charges commonly carry 
“excessive” punishment, both in the abstract and as applied in a particular case. 
But those who spot overcharging sometimes focus upon an especially 
disproportionate aspect of a prosecution. This emphasis tends to hinge on the 
speaker’s personal concerns. For example, one might justify a focus upon charges 
qua charges on the ground that there exists no meaningful check on prosecutorial 
discretion at the charging stage of a case. Once filed, the bare charges themselves 
                                                          
43
  W. David Ball, Defunding State Prisons 6 (January 2013) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220028 (“there is no such thing as a ‘normal’ 
charge or ‘normal’ enforcement in a given case to which we could compare ‘over-charging’ and 
‘over-enforcement’). See also Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 2: 
Prosecutorial Discretion), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2013, 11:34 PM) 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-charges-against-aaron-swartz-part-2-
prosecutorial-discretion/ (observing that, in deciding what amounted to sufficient but not 
excessive punishment in connection with the prosecution of Aaron Swartz, “we need a benchmark 
of how much punishment was enough.”). 
44
  See, e.g., Alex Stamos, The Truth About Aaron Swartz’s “Crime,” UNHANDLED 
EXCEPTION  (Jan, 12, 2013), http://unhandled.com/2013/01/12/the-truth-about-aaron-swartzs-
crime/ (opining that Aaron Swartz was “massively overcharge[d],” since his “downloading of 
journal articles from an unlocked closet [was] not an offense worth 35 years in jail.”); Lincoln 
Caplan, Aaron Swartz and Prosecutorial Discretion, TAKING NOTE (Jan. 18, 2013, 10:06 AM) 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/aaron-swartz-and-prosecutorial-discretion/ 
(stating that federal prosecutors “go after defendants tooth and nail, overcharging them from the 
abundance of criminal laws with sentences so severe and out of proportion to the crime that, as 
now happens in 95 percent of criminal cases, the prudent choice is to cop a plea.”). 
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may affect the accused’s reputation, not to mention the course of subsequent 
proceedings.
45
 Alternatively, those who perceive in overcharging greater 
opportunities for disparate treatment of judicial-system “insiders” and 
“outsiders”46 may dwell on the maximum punishment attached to initial charges. 
Outsiders, after all, may not know about lower “going rates” that may exist for 
plea deals. Finally, observers most concerned about the prospect of defendants 
being coerced into stilted plea bargains might concentrate upon the actual, as 
opposed to theoretical punishment implicated by a charging instrument. 
 
Because each commentator brings both her own baseline for “reasonable” 
prosecution and a unique set of concerns to the overcharging debate, each puts her 
own gloss on “overcharging” when using the word to attack a lack of 
proportionality in a charging decision. As with the first conception of 
“overcharging,” these variations tend to imbue the “proportionality” definition of 
overcharging with a know-it-when-one-sees-it quality, such that it offers little 
assistance in defining the precise boundaries of the term. It is unsurprising, then, 
that there exists a third meaning of overcharging that grounds the proportionality 
and inadequate-proof approaches by connecting them to specific actions taken by 
prosecutors. 
 
3. Overcharging as Prosecutorial Insincerity 
 
A third conception of overcharging differs from the first two in that its 
principal concern involves the knowing misuse of charges by prosecutors. This 
view espies overcharging when a prosecutor files an “excessive” charge or 
charges (in the sense that either the charges are disproportionate or they lack 
adequate proof) without any subjective desire to pursue these offenses to 
conviction. Rather, the prosecutor alleges these offenses as bargaining chips, 
holding out the possibility of their dismissal or reduction in exchange for the 
defendant’s entry of a guilty or no-contest plea to other charges.47 The 
                                                          
45
  BENNETT, supra note 35, at 3 (“A . . . consequence of overharging is the effect that the 
original charges may have upon sentencing judges, probation officers and parole boards, even if 
they are dismissed as part of the plea agreement.”). 
46
  See generally Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006) (discussing this concern).  
47
  E.g., State v. Harvey, No. E2008–01081–CCA–R3–CD , 2010 WL 5550655, Tenn. Crim. 
App. Dec. 30, 2010, at *28 (“Tennessee courts have referred to overcharging as a prosecutorial 
practice of charging a defendant with a greater charge in seeking a conviction for a lesser-included 
offense.”); RICHARD L. LIPPKE, THE ETHICS OF PLEA BARGAINING 31 (2011) (“When they 
strategically overcharge, prosecutors do not simply respond to the evidence that individuals have 
committed one or more crimes. Instead, they select charges partly with an eye to putting pressure 
in defendants to plead guilty.”). In this same vein, the Commentary to the ABA Standards for the 
Prosecution Function explains: 
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prosecutor’s subjective interest in dismissing the surplus or extreme charges 
thereby substantiates what might otherwise represent a nebulous “overcharging” 
claim.   
 
This critique of overcharging taps the unease that surrounds the practice of 
plea bargaining generally.
48
 As one observer has noted, echoing arguments 
directed against modern plea bargaining, this sort of overcharging “has a chilling 
effect on the exercise of the constitutional right to trial. . . . Even innocent 
defendants may be so overwhelmed by the degree or number of the charges 
against them that they will forego the risks of trial for the certainty of a guilty 
plea.”49 Of course, the coercion attendant to plea bargaining does not arise only 
when a defendant has been overcharged. The distinctive concern associated with 
overcharged cases involves a sense that the charges set too high a baseline for the 
bargain, and thus create additional, undesirable “space” for coercion.   
 
This understanding of overcharging also reflects some other special 
concerns. To many observers, trials remain the preferred means of resolving a 
criminal case, with plea bargains being only grudgingly accepted as a necessary 
but decidedly second-best feature of criminal procedure landscape.
50
 Insofar as an 
overcharged case, on its face, invites a plea deal to lesser charges, it appears to 
reverse these preferences.
51
 This sort of overcharging also tends to call the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The chief criticism voiced by defense counsel with respect to the exercise of 
prosecution discretion . . . is that prosecutors ‘overcharge’ in order to obtain 
leverage for plea negotiations. Although it is difficult to give a definition of 
‘overcharging’ in verbal form, it is clear that the heart of this criticism is a belief 
that prosecutors bring charges not in the good-faith belief that they are 
appropriate under the circumstances and with an intention of prosecuting them 
to a conclusion, but merely as a harassing and coercive device, in the 
expectation that a guilty plea will result and that it will not be necessary to 
proceed to trial, verdict and sentence on all of the charges or at the degree of 
crime originally stated.  
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 76 
(3d ed. 1993).  
48
  This literature is too extensive to cite in full here. One leading work in this vein is 
Stephen Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1987–91 (1992). 
49
  BENNETT, supra note 35, at 3. 
50
  HUSAK, supra note 30, at 23 (“Few knowledgeable commentators are prepared to defend 
the justice of plea bargaining. . . . Presumably, plea bargaining survives because no one knows 
how our penal system could function without it.”); Note, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: An End to 
the Same Old Song and Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505, 506 (1999) (observing that “many legal 
commentators and participants view plea bargaining as inevitable,” citing numerous articles to this 
effect). 
51
  In an overcharged case, as that term is being used above, neither the prosecution nor the 
defense necessarily desires a trial on all charges. The prosecutor may agree with the defense 
assessment of the charges as too harsh, yet consider them sufficiently useful in securing the 
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sincerity of the prosecution and its allegations into question.
52
 With tactical 
overcharging, the prosecution invokes some crimes principally as procedural 
devices, without any concomitant desire to obtain convictions for the offenses. 
This practice connotes that a prosecutor may allege crimes for a variety of 
purposes, aside from gaining a conviction for that particular offense. Although the 
prosecutor does intend for these allegations to produce convictions for other 
offenses, this instrumental use of criminal allegations suggests a broadening of 
prosecutorial prerogatives that some may find troubling.
53
 Moreover, the repeated 
allegation of certain crimes without an accompanying desire to convict defendants 
of these offenses may erode the moral force of the criminal prohibitions 
themselves.
54
  
 
This assessment of overcharging, like the others, has its shortcomings. In 
particular, the objective-subjective focus runs the risk of dodging the admittedly 
difficult “proportionality” inquiry simply by punting this issue to prosecutors.55 
With this take on overcharging, a tendency exists to look to the subjective 
intentions of prosecutors not as merely substantiating a pre-existing claim of 
disproportionality, but rather as setting the baseline for “reasonable” charges in 
the first instance. This deference runs the risk that a prosecutor will be seen as 
overcharging only when she is prepared to dismiss or reduce charges pursuant to a 
plea deal. If this were true, prosecutors could duck all accusations of 
“overcharging” simply by never agreeing to charge bargains. This result sounds 
strange, as it should; yet it may follow from an approach toward overcharging that 
allows prosecutors to define the term.  
 
Of the three impressions of overcharging, the third is most conducive to 
measurement, with the prosecutor’s dismissal of charges in connection with a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
defendant’s cooperation in plea bargaining as to warrant the risk of an excessive sentence upon 
conviction, should plea bargaining stall.  
52
  See BENNETT, supra note 35, at 4 (“the true horror of overcharging is that citizens are 
being charged not on the basis of the evidence against them, but on the basis of pragmatic 
considerations in the prosecutor’s office.”). 
53
  See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening / Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 33 (2002) (describing overcharging as a “particularly noxious form of dishonesty” that 
occurs in connection with plea bargaining, with this noxiousness owing to the fact that “the public 
in general, and victims in particular, lose faith in a system where the primary goal is processing 
and the secondary goal is justice.”). 
54
  See Graham, Facilitating Crimes, supra note 11, at 705–07. 
55
  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 47, at 77 (observing that “[t]he line separating 
overcharging from the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion is necessarily a subjective one, 
but the key consideration is the prosecutor’s commitment to the interests of justice, fairly bringing 
those charges he or she believes are supported by the facts without ‘piling on’ charges in order to 
unduly leverage an accused to forgo his or her right to trial.”).  
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defendant’s guilty or no-contest plea serving as a “tell.” But this take on 
overcharging also presents some significant measurement challenges, as related 
below.   
 
II. MEASURING OVERCHARGING 
Criticisms of overcharging tend to come and go with high-profile cases in 
which observers detect prosecutorial excess. The typically ad hoc, case-specific 
nature of the resulting conversations has generated little understanding as to the 
pervasiveness of this practice. Instead, the spare popular dialogue that surrounds 
overcharging in general tends to involve glib assertions to the effect that 
prosecutors “regularly” overcharge.56 These statements shed no light on issues 
such as precisely how often overcharging occurs, or whether there exist 
prosecuting entities that engage in this practice more or less often than others do. 
If overcharging is a serious problem, this lack of information will frustrate 
efforts to devise a solution. As the saying goes, it is difficult to fix something that 
isn’t measured. Opacity as who overcharges most and least often will especially 
hinder the development of pinpoint, as opposed to blunderbuss solutions. The 
dearth of analysis on overcharging also denies observers of possible “best 
practices” drawn from those prosecutors’ offices that rarely overcharge. 
These gaps suggest the utility of metrics that might provide some insight 
into the prevalence of overcharging within and across jurisdictions. 
Unfortunately, the necessary data do not exist for at least some of these 
measurements. For example, one might spot pervasive overcharging by 
contrasting the likely sentences across a set of cases, as initially charged, with the 
prosecution’s actual plea offers to the defense. Unfortunately, these reference 
points rarely (if ever) appear in print, at least not for robust case cohorts.  
Data that is even more basic may not exist for many jurisdictions. For 
federal criminal cases, however, there exist a somewhat useful series of datasets. 
Entries in this series, compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, relates charge-specific data for all criminal cases that terminate in United 
States District Courts in a given fiscal year (October 1 to September 30). The data 
include information such as the five “most serious” initial charges in each case, 
and the dispositions of the five “most serious” charges at the time of case 
termination.  
The discussion below mines this data to propose a handful of 
measurements that, at least when put together, point toward those federal judicial 
                                                          
56
  E.g., Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, supra note 25.  
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districts that merit further study either as possible hotbeds of overcharging, or as 
offices that have tended to avoid this practice. The discussion relies upon seven 
years of data from the AOUSC, reflecting cases that terminated between October 
1, 2002 and September 30, 2009.
57
 The data have been collected into a single 
dataset, referred to below as the “AOUSC Database.”58 This database consists of 
623,430 records, each of which relates the disposition of charges filed against a 
particular defendant in a specific federal case that terminated during this span. 
The text below relates a series of studies that employ the AOUSC 
Database to tease out the prevalence of overcharging in federal court. These 
inquiries relate principally to the third understanding of “overcharging” presented 
above, inclusive of its overlaps with the other two basic meanings afforded to the 
term. Though this third conception of overcharging is principally concerned with 
the prosecutor’s subjective intent, it helpfully carries an objective marker, in the 
form of the prosecutor’s dismissal of charges in connection with a plea deal.   
As a first step toward quantifying the prevalence of this type of 
overcharging, the AOUSC Database was sorted, compressed, and trolled to 
                                                          
57
  The datasets thus capture a time frame in which the charging practices of U.S. Attorneys 
were governed by a memorandum issued by Attorney General John Ashcroft. This memo directed 
prosecutors to typically “charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses 
that are supported by the facts” of a case.  MEMORANDUM FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN 
ASHCROFT TO ALL FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 2 (Sept. 22, 2003). This approach has since been 
superseded somewhat by a new policy advising that the charging decision “must always be made 
in the context of ‘an individualized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the 
specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with the purpose of the Federal criminal code, 
and maximize the impact of Federal resources on the crime.’ ” MEMORANDUM FROM ATTORNEY 
GENERAL ERIC HOLDER TO ALL FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 2 (May 19, 2010), quoting U.S. 
Attorney’s Manual § 9-27.300. The effect of this shift in policy on individual districts’ charging 
practices is admittedly unclear at this time.  
58
  The data referenced in the text above derive from a series of datasets that each contain 
information regarding federal criminal cases that terminated in a given fiscal year (October 1 to 
September 30), which the author has compiled into a single database (the “AOUSC Database,” 
which remains in the possession of the author). The datasets comprising this database are as 
follows: United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics 
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2003 [ICPSR 
24153]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics 
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2004 [ICPSR 
24170]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics 
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2005 [ICPSR 
24187]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics 
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2006 [ICPSR 
24205]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics 
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2007 [ICPSR 
24222]; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics 
Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2008 [ICPSR 
29242]; and United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice 
Statistics Program: Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases in District Court—Terminated, 2009 
[ICPSR 30784]). 
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ascertain: (1) the frequency with which charges were dismissed (as opposed to 
some other disposition) in cases that resulted in a guilty or nolo contendere plea to 
one or more counts; (2) the frequency with which “most serious” charging 
offenses, at the time of initial case filing, lost that status in cases that led to a 
guilty or no-contest plea; and (3) the frequency with which charges under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c), which carries a five-year “mandatory minimum” sentence, were 
dismissed in cases that entailed a defendant’s guilty or no-contest plea. The text 
below relates the reasoning behind each of these metrics. Since the AOUSC data 
include the particular federal judicial district in which each case terminated, and 
since most cases within a given judicial district are filed by the local U.S. 
Attorney’s office, the data permit the district-by-district comparison of charging 
and conviction information.
59
 
A. Charge Dismissals 
First, a basic metric would examine the frequency of charge dismissals in 
cases that terminated, in whole or in part, by a guilty or nolo contendere plea 
(538,085 cases).
60
 The percentage of counts that reflect termination by dismissal 
within these cases might provide a very rough take on the dynamics of charge 
bargaining within a given jurisdiction. As performed on the AOUSC Database, 
this analysis yielded the following list of jurisdictions with particularly low 
dismissal rates:  
Table I: Federal Judicial Districts with the Lowest Charge-Dismissal Rates 
 in Pled Cases, AOUSC Data, FY 2003–FY200961 
 
District FY 2003–FY2009 
Dismissal Rate 
Rhode Island 5.6% 
Massachusetts 11.7% 
E.D. Pennsylvania 15.1% 
New Mexico 16.6% 
Maine 18.8% 
                                                          
59
  The data that comprise the AOUSC Database are admittedly imperfect. In addition to the 
aforementioned five-count limitation, inputting errors and missing cases also appear within the 
data. These shortcomings augur caution when using the data to draw minute distinctions. 
Accordingly, the discussion below will focus on jurisdictions that lie at the extremes of various 
rankings. This focus attenuates the risk of a material mischaracterization of a district’s charging 
practices. 
60
  Here, and in the subsequent charts that relate the dismissal rates of charges brought under 
18 U.S.C. § 924, the dismissal rates reflect all dismissals assigned either of the codes “1” or “D” 
by the AOUSC. The two codes differ in that the latter reflects dismissals without prejudice.  
61
  AOUSC Database, supra note 58. The District of New Jersey had a dismissal rate of 23.2 
percent, but an extremely high number of counts that reflected a nolle prosequi disposition; the 
District was therefore excluded from the chart above. 
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S.D. Indiana 18.9% 
N.D. Florida 24.7% 
N.D. Alabama 24.8% 
S.D. Illinois 25.2% 
New Hampshire 25.7% 
 
Meanwhile, according to the AOUSC Database, the judicial districts with 
the highest dismissal rates were: 
Table II: Federal Judicial Districts with the Highest Charge-Dismissal Rates 
 in Pled Cases, AOUSC Data, FY 2003–FY200962 
 
District FY 2003–FY2009 
Dismissal Rate 
N.D. West Virginia 56.3% 
Kansas 53.6% 
Vermont 51.6% 
Minnesota 51.5% 
M.D. Pennsylvania 50.7% 
E.D. New York 50.6% 
S.D. Alabama 50.0% 
E.D. Arkansas 49.2% 
W.D. Virginia 48.9% 
E.D. California 48.4% 
 
Of course, charge dismissals on their own provide a weak proxy for 
overcharging. The volume and rate of charge dismissals in pled cases depends on 
many extrinsic matters, such as the types of charges that tend to be filed in a 
jurisdiction. Prosecutors in the District of New Mexico, for example, might 
dismiss few charges in pled cases because they file a large share of their cases 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (re-entry into the United States by a removed felon),
63
 a 
federal crime that is so simple to prove it rarely implicates any charge 
bargaining.
64
 A large number of count-heavy fraud prosecutions in the Eastern 
District of New York, by comparison, may inflate that jurisdiction’s charge-
dismissal rate.   
 
                                                          
62
  Id. 
63
  With a few exceptions, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 makes it a federal crime for someone who “has been 
denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an order of 
exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding,” to thereafter enter, attempt to enter, or be at any time 
found in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).   
64
  Kyle Graham, Crimes, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content, 
Pleas, and Trials, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1617–19 (2012).  
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Furthermore, not all charge dismissals in connection with plea deals 
bespeak overcharging. For example, state prosecutors routinely allege two counts 
in driving under the influence cases. The first alleges that the defendant drove a 
vehicle while “under the influence” of alcohol.65 The second charges that the 
defendant drove with a blood-alcohol concentration at or over a certain level.
66
 
Most of the time, more than adequate proof supports both counts, and the same 
result typically obtains at sentencing regardless of whether the defendant pleads 
guilty to one of these charges, or both. Prosecutors, therefore, usually gain no 
substantial plea-bargaining leverage by alleging both crimes. In these cases, the 
prosecutors commonly accept a guilty plea to one of these charges or the other, 
and dismiss the remaining charge as a pro forma matter. Even assuming a 
prosecutor filed such a case knowing that it was substantially certain to resolve 
with a guilty plea to one count that contemplated the dismissal of the other 
charge, this knowledge would not amount to overcharging. For one thing, there 
charges would not be disproportionate to the defendant’s conduct; for another, the 
necessary prosecutorial scienter would not exist.
67
 
 
B. “Most Serious” Charge Substitutions 
If the dismissal of any charge pursuant to a plea does not, on its own, 
provide an especially meaningful indication of overcharging, perhaps a narrowed 
focus on the dismissal of “serious” charges will. These data may not be available, 
or easy to collect, for all jurisdictions. But as indicated above, the AOUSC 
Dataset identifies the “most serious” offense at initial charging, as well as the 
“most serious” offense at the time of case termination. Since charge dismissals 
represent the most common explanation for these substitutions, charting the 
discrepancies between these two offenses might provide a rough sense of the 
frequency of at least one form of deliberate overcharging.
68
  
The following tables indicate how often, among pled cases, the charge 
identified as the most serious charging offense in a given case retained that status 
at the time of case termination. The data are broken out on a year-by-year basis, to 
highlight any inconsistencies across the studied time period. In the table 
                                                          
65
  E.g., California Vehicle Code § 23152(a) (WEST 2000). 
66
  E.g.. California Vehicle Code § 23152(b) (WEST 2000). 
67
  Similar circumstances often arise when defendants are charged with both grand theft 
(e.g., California  Penal Code § 487(a) (WEST 2000)) and possession of the stolen property (e.g., 
California Penal Code § 496 (WEST 2000)).  
68
  See Ron Sylvester, Prosecutors’ Conviction Rate Falls, THE WICHITA EAGLE (Wichita, 
KS), Aug. 11, 2002, at 1A (reporting the results of a study in which a conviction on the most 
serious charge in a case served as a proxy for proper charging).  
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immediately below, the names of districts that also appeared on the list of districts 
with low charge-dismissal rates are presented in bold text. 
Table III: Federal Judicial Districts with the Highest Retention Rates of Most 
Serious Charging Offenses in Pled Cases, FY 2003–FY200969 
 
District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
S.D. Indiana 97.6% 95.4% 97.9% 97.3% 93.9% 95.6% 93.5% 95.9% 
Rhode 
Island 
93.0% 96.3% 93.1% 96.9% 96.4% 98.9% 96.4% 95.8% 
Maine 91.2% 93.4% 96.1% 97.7% 97.3% 94.8% 94.2% 95.0% 
S.D. Illinois 94.8% 94.4% 95.3% 95.7% 94.8% 91.1% 93.8% 94.3% 
Northern 
Mariana 
Islands 
100% 89.7% 95.5% 93.8% 100% 94.7% 85.7% 93.4% 
New Mexico 82.1% 92.5% 94.0% 95.4% 94.4% 95.5% 97.0% 93.4% 
C.D. Illinois 95.1% 91.9% 93.0% 92.3% 92.9% 93.1% 94.6% 93.3% 
N.D. 
Alabama 
93.8% 93.7% 92.8% 95.4% 91.3% 92.8% 92.9% 93.2% 
S.D. 
California 
91.1% 90.0% 89.9% 91.8% 92.4% 93.6% 93.8% 92.1% 
E.D. 
Pennsylvania 
90.1% 90.3% 91.5% 93.1% 92.7% 94.1% 93.7% 92.1% 
All Districts 79.6% 81.9% 82.8% 83.3% 83.9% 84.0% 85.3% 83.1% 
 
Meanwhile, the judicial districts that experienced the highest rates of 
“most serious” charge substitution (with the names of districts that appeared on 
the list of jurisdictions with the highest “generic” dismissal rates being 
highlighted in bold text) were: 
 
Table IV: Federal Judicial Districts with the Lowest Retention Rates of Most 
Serious Charging Offenses in Pled Cases, FY 2003–FY200970 
 
District 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
N.D. West 
Virginia 
48.6% 58.3% 63.8% 62.6% 62.2% 56.5% 72.8% 61.2% 
W.D. 
Washington 
64.9% 69.7% 72.4% 65.8% 73.6% 65.7% 67.1% 68.4% 
E.D. 
California 
58.1% 60.0% 71.7% 72.4% 67.3% 75.9% 77.6% 69.0% 
E.D. New 
York 
62.5% 71.8% 69.3% 68.2% 71.6% 72.7% 70.4% 69.1% 
E.D. Texas 67.5% 64.8% 69.7% 68.2% 72.9% 73.6% 72.5% 70.2% 
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Oregon 71.4% 73.0% 74.0% 72.5% 72.1% 70.8% 60.9% 70.6% 
Kansas 71.1% 75.5% 73.3% 68.4% 71.0% 69.7% 67.4% 70.9% 
S.D. Florida 59.0% 67.8% 68.0% 69.4% 76.0% 77.5% 80.5% 71.3% 
E.D. 
Arkansas 
66.9% 73.4% 73.6% 76.3% 73.2% 71.0% 64.9% 71.3% 
South 
Dakota 
75.9% 66.8% 69.6% 68.4% 79.0% 69.4% 71.9% 71.5% 
 
Though the swapping of “most serious” charges in pled cases probably 
provides a better proxy for overcharging than the frequency of charge dismissals 
does, this metric also leaves much to be desired. For one thing, this measurement 
cannot detect “horizontal” charge bargaining in situations where the prosecution 
has alleged only multiple counts of a single crime, or has agreed to dismiss less 
serious charges in exchange for a guilty plea to the most serious offense. Also, the 
AOUSC Dataset premises the “most serious” charge designation on the base 
offense level assigned to the crime under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.
71
 This reliance on the Guidelines can produce misleading results in 
situations where additional facts, such as the amount of illegal drugs at issue, 
ultimately play a more important role in determining the defendant’s likely 
sentence.   
Furthermore, this reliance on base offense levels can produce haphazard 
results. Vast discrepancies may appear across similarly situated judicial districts 
when both districts (1) often charge identical sets of crimes, with each crime 
having the same base offense level, but (2) customarily dismiss different crimes 
within these sets as part of plea deals. Assume that in such a situation, the 
Guidelines identify Crime A as the “more serious” of the two offenses, an 
arbitrary designation. A jurisdiction that routinely dismisses Crime A instead of 
Crime B as a pro forma part of plea agreements will record a very high charge 
substitution rate, suggesting it routinely overcharges. A jurisdiction that dismisses 
Crime B for the same reason, however, will have a very low substitution rate. 
This discrepancy seems particularly unfair when, as with prosecutions under the 
driving under the influence laws discussed above, the prosecution gains little to 
no tactical advantage at plea bargaining from its decision to allege both crimes.  
Notwithstanding these caveats, and the fact that the two datapoints are not 
wholly independent from one another, the data regarding the substitution of “most 
serious” charging offenses might provide a useful cross-check to the “generic” 
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  The base offense level for a crime provides the starting point for sentencing calculations 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Higher base offense levels translate to lengthier 
Guidelines-prescribed advisory terms. ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FRANK O. BOWMAN, III & 
JENNIFER C. WOLL, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 1305 (2010). 
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dismissal data. There exists significant overlap between the lists, at both extremes. 
The Southern District of Indiana, the District of Rhode Island, the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, the District of Maine, the District of New Mexico, and the 
Southern District of Illinois appear on both the list of jurisdictions with the lowest 
dismissal rates, and the list of jurisdictions with the lowest substitution rates for 
“most serious” charging offenses. At the other extreme, the Northern District of 
West Virginia, the Eastern District of Arkansas, the Eastern District of California, 
the Eastern District of New York, and the District of Kansas had among the 
highest dismissal rates and the highest substitution rates.   
C. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Dismissals 
To further pin down the existence of overcharging, as opposed to 
innocuous charge dismissals incident to pleas, a third metric would consider how 
often prosecutors dismiss a specific crime or enhancement believed to commonly 
serve as a government bargaining chip in plea negotiations. In this vein, it is 
sometimes asserted
72
 that prosecutors often use the gun enhancement found at 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)
73
 to catalyze plea bargaining. This charge carries a five-year 
mandatory minimum term, to run consecutively with the sentence assigned to the 
underlying crime. The nature and content of the charge catalyze plea bargaining: 
defendants want to eliminate the five-year term, while prosecutors are willing to 
exchange its dismissal for guilty pleas to the underlying charges. The 924(c) 
charge’s reputation as a plea-deal facilitator suggests that the frequency with 
which prosecutors dismiss these charges might reflect prior overcharging.  
Accordingly, the table below relates the federal districts with the lowest 
924(c) dismissal rates in cases resolved in whole or in part by a defendant’s guilty 
or nolo contendere plea. (The overall dismissal rate for 924(c) charges in these 
cases during the studied time period, across all districts, was 45.5%.
74
) Judicial 
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  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL FIREARM OFFENDERS, 1992–98 
6 (2000) (discussing the frequent dismissal of 924(c) charges); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. 
Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and 
its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1293 (1997) (observing that 
the dismissal of provable 924(c) counts represented a common form of charge-bargaining in 
federal prosecutions); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An 
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 548–49, 551–52 (1992) (remarking on the dismissal of 924(c) counts). 
73
  Section 924(c) of Title 18 provides that a five-year (or higher) sentence enhancement is 
to be imposed upon “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an 
enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for 
which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or 
who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). 
74
  AOUSC Database, supra note 58. 
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districts that appeared within either the list of districts with the lowest general 
dismissal rates (Table I), or the list of districts with the lowest substitution rates 
for “most serious” charges (Table III), are in bold; the names of districts that 
appear on both of these other tables are in bold italics: 
 
 
Table V: Federal Judicial Districts with the Lowest Dismissal Rates  
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Charges in Pled Cases, FY 2003–FY200975 
 
District 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
Dismissal Rate 
Northern Mariana Islands 0.0% 
N.D. Alabama 13.8% 
Maine 15.0% 
N.D. Florida 16.6% 
W.D. Arkansas 16.7% 
S.D. Indiana 17.2% 
Massachusetts 19.5% 
E.D. Pennsylvania 21.0% 
C.D. Illinois 24.7% 
W.D. Wisconsin 25.0% 
Rhode Island 25.0% 
 
The following districts, meanwhile, had the highest 924(c) dismissal rates 
in cases terminated by plea. Text in bold or bold italics connotes a district’s 
appearance within either the list of districts with the highest general dismissal 
rates (Table II) or the list of districts with the highest substitution rates for “most 
serious” charges (Table IV) (bold text), or on both lists (bold italics):  
 
Table VI: Federal Judicial Districts with the Highest Dismissal Rates  
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Charges in Pled Cases, FY 2003–FY200976 
 
District 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
Dismissal Rate 
E.D. Arkansas 73.0% 
S.D. Georgia 70.7% 
Minnesota 66.9% 
M.D. Pennsylvania 66.3% 
Vermont 65.5% 
Arizona 65.2% 
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E.D. Washington 64.4% 
E.D. Texas 64.2% 
E.D. New York 63.8% 
Oregon 62.8% 
 
 
D. Combined Results 
Summing the results of these three metrics reveals those districts that have 
compiled particularly distinctive charge-dismissal records over the studied time 
period.
77
 The lowest dismissal rates in connection with pled cases belong to the 
District of Maine, the Southern District of Indiana, the District of Rhode Island, 
the Northern District of Alabama, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. These 
low dismissal rates may owe to a shared hard line on plea bargaining, it may 
bespeak careful charging practices, or it may owe to altogether different factors. 
Yet if overcharging represents a concern, these districts seem to hold promise as 
potential sources of best charging practices.     
At the other extreme, the highest amassed dismissal rates belong to the 
Eastern District of Arkansas, the Eastern District of New York, the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, the District of Minnesota, and the Northern District of 
West Virginia. Once again, there may exist good explanations for the high 
dismissal rates in these jurisdictions, independent of overcharging. Alternatively 
or in addition, changes in policy or personnel since the studied time period may 
have altered the charge-dismissal profiles of these offices. Yet the evidence 
suggests that a comprehensive, critical study of overcharging in the federal system 
might begin with these districts, to ascertain what accounts for their frequent 
dismissal of generic, serious, and “bargaining chip” offenses.  
III. CONCLUSION 
To reiterate, a district’s position at either extreme of the aforementioned 
metrics does not establish that it employed or still employs “good” or “bad” 
charging practices. Limitations of and errors within the data, idiosyncrasies in 
AOUSC coding, variations in docket composition across judicial districts, the 
relative strength or weakness of the defense bar in a judicial district, and the 
possible influence on the data of cases prosecuted by attorneys out of “Main 
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  The discrepancies across the tables also provide some useful insights into the limitations 
of each metric. While the District of New Mexico, for example, had a very low “general” 
dismissal rate in pled cases, there was reason to believe that this rating did not bespeak 
parsimonious charging. The District’s frequent dismissal of § 924(c) charges in pled cases—it 
ranks 50th among judicial districts in this respect—seems to substantiate this suspicion. AOUSC 
Database, supra note 58. 
26 
 
Justice,” as opposed to a local U.S. Attorney’s office, all certainly could, and 
probably did, affect the results. Furthermore, low dismissal rates may be just as 
consistent with overcharging coupled with a consistently hard line on plea 
bargaining, as they are with not overcharging at all.  
Also, there exists every possibility that other, better measurements of 
overcharging exist. But that is the very point of this essay. The discussion above 
points toward a road forward, but it does not purport to specify its precise 
direction. At present, the conversation about overcharging remains in a protean 
stage. The lack of a consensus as to what the term means has deterred any effort 
to track and measure the practice. Within increasing precision as to what 
overcharging means may come enhanced interest in charting the phenomenon, 
and in devising ways to address it—if that is our goal.   
